

DRAFT

3 December 1975

SUBJECT: Principles and Standards for Review of HSC
Draft Papers

1. HSC Staff members have indicated their concern that the technical security review by the Agency of those portions of their report intended for publication in unclassified form will be viewed by the media and public as some form of censorship. They are concerned that the Agency will presume on the opportunity not only to attempt to influence the report, but will employ "security" to suppress portions of the report that are only critical or embarrassing. We have reminded them that the Agency is subject to the President's commitment that security will not be used to suppress criticisms that do not constitute security problems. The problem will be a practical exercise in protecting intelligence sources and methods. While unclassified publication of the report entails some exposures in any event, the Agency's review must be professional, sound and defensible. The purpose of this memorandum is to discuss the approach that is to be taken. It has been coordinated with the Deputy Directors.

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2. As a general practice, we will continue to propose sanitization or paraphrasing (1) to protect sensitive sources and methods, (2) protect foreign liaison relations, and (3) and protect the names of cooperating individuals and commercial and other organizations. Sample situations in which security questions may arise are below:

a. General summary statements of operational activity (e.g., "there is a pattern of CIA activity

25X1C [REDACTED] will not be ob-

25X1C jected to on security grounds alone. Specific references, however, singling out countries and so describing persons that they can be identified, would be questioned.

b. Descriptions of operational techniques (where employed) should be considered carefully to ensure that they do not reveal operational methods to a degree that they would be harmful.

c. Specific identification of Agency employees below the top command level, or descriptions that make their identity readily ascertainable (e.g., "COS Zamboango in 1950") will be questioned.

d. Specific mention of proprietary-type entities is objectionable, as would be descriptions

that would locate and identify them. A general discussion of the existence of proprietaries cannot be objected to, but a detailed review of holding company arrangements, proprietary funding and management techniques, as well as specific overseas operations in connection with them, is to be questioned. Generalized descriptions can well serve the purpose of informing the reader and should be sought in lieu of the more detailed descriptions. In limited instances where publicity or other consideration make it reasonable, specific identification will be accepted (e.g., "the Air America complex").

e. Description of cover arrangements should be kept very general, avoiding any detail that would reveal local strengths or serve to pinpoint individuals, or that permit compromise of cooperating cover organizations.

f. Reference to classified intelligence reports and studies, in the report, should be studied carefully to ensure that they do not reveal intelligence sources and methods. In some instances, a given piece of information may be known to only a very few individuals, and publication of it in unclassified form

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would permit identification of the source. In other instances, certain information could be known only through technical systems for collection. It is doubtful that any one bit of intelligence would contribute much to most discussions, generalized summaries sufficing to make whatever points the HSC has in mind, but there may be instances in which this problem is presented.

g. Reference to specific intelligence gaps that will reveal U.S. capabilities in areas important to the national interest.

h. Appraisals of the performance characteristics of Communist or other foreign military equipment should be carefully considered before agreement for release in unclassified form. If the information has been released officially there is no reason to object to its publication in the unclassified HSC report, unless textual treatment raises other issues of security; if it is in the public domain, but has not been confirmed by official publication, its inclusion in the report should be considered carefully. Publication of estimated performance characteristics may reveal technical collection capabilities. It may be that

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publication of performance characteristics would come in discussion of a current policy issue (e.g., the BACKFIRE bomber), which would raise additional questions of classification.

i. Reporting on recent or current foreign capabilities and intentions, and estimates of these, should be reviewed closely for discussion with the HSC Staff. National policy-level materials, which may compromise national interests, must be handled specially.

j. Specific organizational descriptions, coupled with manpower and budgetary figures, must be studied carefully. In this context, any detailed summary of overseas organization and activities must be reviewed for unintended disclosures, or obvious revelations.

k. Inclusion of non-CIA paper, coming from the Executive level of government, should be identified for appropriate clearance.

l. The interests of other government agencies and departments will be kept in mind, to ensure that their interests are considered for coordination.

The above list of questions is intended as a sample of the sort of issues that may arise. The nature of the subject matter is such that a comprehensive list cannot be prepared in advance, and the issues will have to be dealt with as they arise.

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3. As there is some concern on the part of the HSC Staff members that the security review agreed between Chairman Pike and the President may constitute some form of censorship, care should be exercised to raise only real issues of security, where it is proposed that the draft is intended for unclassified publication. The manner in which the Agency handles its security review also will have an effect on the attitude of the HSC Staff members, so statements of security reservations must be sober and professional, with clear alternatives being offered for how the question can be resolved. The Agency's purpose is to facilitate publication of a properly sanitized, declassified report, where unclassified publication is intended.


4. A relatively consistent response by the Agency will facilitate exchanges with HSC Staff members. The above discussion is intended to contribute to this. Additionally, it will also help if the Agency's format for conveying its comments is consistent. To this end, comments should be made on a separate paper, each comment keyed to the page and line of the draft, first stating the problem raised by the statement in question, why its unclassified publication in that form is subject to reservation, and proposing either a way to resolve the problem editorially by rephrasing the passage, or simply by deleting certain

specific statements where they do not impair the thrust of the paper or the flow or writing. This would serve as the basis for discussions with HSC Staff members, giving them a complete statement on each issue in order to prepare for further exchanges.

5. It is anticipated that working sessions will be arranged following the initial review, to address the questions raised by the comments.

6. The HSC Staff people have indicated an interest in Agency comments on the factual accuracy of the drafts, although it is not yet clear that the Agency will be requested to conduct such a review. This question is sure to arise in the review of reports planned for unclassified publication, but the preparation of classified reports by the HSC do not require review by the Agency. There is nothing at present to prevent the Agency from offering comments on factual accuracy or, for that matter, on conclusions when the opportunity presents itself; however, the HSC is not obliged to accept these comments. Any factual corrections that are offered should be handled as are the security comments, separately, soberly and professionally.

7. The Review Staff will undertake to coordinate the distribution of papers for review, to monitor progress, and assist in working reviews of comments with HSC Staff members that follow the review.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 5 December 1975
TO: Director of Security		
ROOM NO. 4E 60	BUILDING Hqs	
REMARKS: May I please have any comments by 1430 hours, today. Verbal response is fine. 25X1A  Att: RS 75/3589		
FROM: ADDA		
ROOM NO. 7D 26	BUILDING Hqs	EXTENSION 5767

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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